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Broadband Localism
OLIVIER SYLVAIN*
Today, local governments are supplying broadbandservice to residents to fill
the service gap left by major providers. Municipalities are joiningforces with
local anchor institutions and private providers to close the digital divide and
incubate novel public-minded service models. This is the new broadband
localism.
Some stakeholders, however, fear that public participationin the broadband
market will negatively impact competition. They have articulatedthis concern
in state legislation across the country; nineteen states forbid or otherwise
restrict municipal ownership or administration of broadbandand three may
enact similar restrictions this year. No matter the substantive policy merits of
such laws, opponents presume that local governments are "mere creatures of
the state " under traditionalstate and local law, and that restrictions like these
are unproblematic.
This Article does two things. First, one of its chief contributions is to identify
and describe the new broadband localism. In this description, the Article
demystifies the current Internet by explicating its more utilitarian and local
political economy.
Second, the Article fills a void in legal scholarship on the interaction ofpublic
law administrationand the Internet. It argues that the state plenary authority
theory on which opponents have relied to justify restrictions on municipal
broadbandis wrong for at least two reasons. First, the theory overlooks the
extent to which the federal government has carved out a positive role for
municipalities in an array of legislative fields, including telecommunications
and cable, the forbearers of broadband Second, the theory neglects the ways
in which the new broadband localismfurthers the constitutionalprinciples of
democratic accountability and pluralism. This Article posits that, as expressed
through recent federal legislation and local efforts, we are witnessing the
emergence of an administrative regime that is far more accountable and
responsive to local priorities than state plenary authority theory appreciates.
Congress, the Article concludes, must act to preempt state restrictions, or
courts must accept that municipalities arefundamental to the administrationof
public law in this distinctively dynamic legislativefield
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. The author is grateful to
Jim Bailer, Jim Brudney, Nestor Davidson, Annie Decker, Sheila Foster, Caroline Gentile,
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Mitchell, Mark Patterson, Frank Pasquale, Joel Reidenberg, Aaron Saiger, Dean Smith,
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I. INTRODUCTION

All broadband is local. The speed and bandwidth capacity of local network
infrastructure determines users' media consumption habits. They affect whether
users socialize through email, social networking, or video chat. They define
whether users turn to cable television or their laptop to watch video
programming.' High-speed, high-capacity broadband offers more utilitarian
advantages as well: it is the difference between educational success and drift,
2
employment and joblessness, health and sickness.

I See, e.g., Brian Stelter, New Service Will Stream Local TV Stations in New York,
MEDIA DECODER (Feb. 14, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
02/14/new-service-will-stream-local-tv-stations-in-new-york/.
2See Jyoti Choudrie & Yogesh Kumar Dwivedi, Analysing the Factors of Broadband
Adoption in the Household (2004) (unpublished research paper, Brunel University),
available at http://is2.Ise.ac.uk/asp/aspecis/20040034.pdf.
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The local nature of broadband service is at odds with a romantic view about
users surfing the Internet free from the impediment of earthly location. The
cloud and space metaphors in vogue today bespeak a sense of transcendental
freedom. But this talk of clouds is more romance than reality. The late Senator
Ted Stevens, who was ridiculed by bloggers and late-night television hosts for
saying that the Internet was nothing more than a "series of tubes," was on to
something. Earthbound transmission equipment, cables, and technologies
combine to make the Internet run as it does. Local broadband providers'
network management practices, the grounded towers that loom over
neighborhoods, and the cables that run under city streets determine the quality
3
of users' Internet experiences.
Incumbent broadband providers like Comcast or AT&T and major Internet
stakeholders like Google have recognized for some time now that the speed and
bandwidth capacity of "last-mile" infrastructure affects users' media choices
and consumption habits. 4 These private companies, however, only invest in
broadband in densely populated or affluent local areas from which they expect
immediate returns. 5 This strategic choice has exacerbated existing gaps in
access and quality of service; users in only the most fortunate urban centers in
the country can count on state-of-the-art connectivity while others can barely
6
count on the skimpiest of service.
The gap in service has created an opportunity for local governments almost
everywhere to provide and administer broadband service. They have become
incubators for innovative last-mile infrastructure design and transmission
technology. They are bringing to bear a unique set of institutional competences
addressed to the distinctive informational and communications needs of their
7
constituencies.

3

See Liz Ruskin, Internet "Tubes" Speech Turns Spotlight, Ridicule onto Sen.

Stevens, COMMON DREAMS (July 15, 2006), http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/
0715-06.htm; see also ANDREW BLUM, TUBES: A JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE INTERNET
8 (2012).
4 Study: Web Users Prefer Speed over Customization, WEBSITEOPTIMIZATION.COM,
http://www.websiteoptimization.com/speed/tweak/design-factors/ (last modified Apr. 13,
2010).
5 See STEPHEN B. POCIASK, SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, BROADBAND

BUSINESSES
SMALL
RURAL
BY
USE
http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/rs269tot.pdf.
6
See id. at 25.

23

(2005),

available

at

7Cf GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING

WALLS 210-17 (1999); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a
DemocraticDefense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2027 (2000) (reviewing FRUG,
supra); see also PETER KATZ, THE NEW URBANISM: TOWARD AN ARCHITECTURE OF
COMMUNITY XXXV-XXXVI (1994); DOUGLAS S. KELBAUGH, REPAIRING THE AMERICAN
METROPOLIS 192-95 (2002); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN

CITIES 410-12 (1961).
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These descriptive facts comprise broadbandlocalism. But they also reflect
a normative policy orientation that privileges municipal autonomy,
experimentation, and entrepreneurship. From this perspective, local
governments are best suited to administering public law in a wide range of
fields and addressing it to the idiosyncratic needs of their constituents.
To their credit, Congress, federal agencies, some states, and hundreds of
municipalities are early converts to the new broadband localism. They have
removed barriers to market entry and encouraged municipal leadership.
Through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in particular,
Congress has awarded over seven billion dollars to governments and private
providers across the country for local broadband build-out and adoption. 8 The
Recovery Act explicitly relies on the initiative of local communities for project
design and implementation.
Some stakeholders, however, are fighting the emergent approach tooth-andnail. Major incumbent providers in particular have opposed municipal
broadband on the premise that it distorts the operation of the price mechanism.
They have lobbied state legislatures aggressively to forbid or otherwise restrict
municipal ownership of infrastructure or administration of service. Private
providers and other opponents presume that municipalities cannot supply
broadband service if their parent states forbid it. Under traditional state and
local law, these opponents argue, local governments are mere creatures of the
state. Nineteen states have responded accordingly, enacting restrictions on
municipal broadband, 9 two of which are close to tightening existing
restrictions.' 0 The Georgia legislature is considering a bill that would impose
restrictions where none existed before. "I
The conceptions of state plenary authority on which some state
policymakers have relied to justify restrictions on municipal broadband, I argue,
are misguided and antiquated. State restrictions are putting a wrench in the
Internet's maturation from the boutique curiosity of a generation ago to the full-

81ssues:

Technology,

WHITEHOUSE.GOv,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/

technology (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
9

ALA. CODE § 11-50B-1 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-409(b)(1) (West 2012);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-27-201 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 350.81 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:844.48 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 484.2252 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 237.19 (2012);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 392.410(7) (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-594, 86-595 (2012); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 268.086, 710.147 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 160A-340 to -340.6 (West
2012); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3014(h) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2620 (2012);
TEN. CODE ANN. § 7-52-601 (West 2012); TEx. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 54.201 (West 2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-18-201 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-2108.6, 56-265.4:4,
56-484.7:1 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 54.16.330 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 66.0422
(2012).
10 H.R. 2695, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. (Minn. 2012); H.R. 3508, 119th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011).
IIS. 313, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012).
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service public resource of tomorrow. They are undermining innovation and
exacerbating disparities in access and quality of service.
Since the introduction of the printing press, commentators have lamented2
the law's inability to keep pace with changes in communication technology.'
Writing in this same vein, I argue here that state restrictions are obstacles to
technological development. I draw from recent scholarship on "cooperative
localism" in particular to argue for a more flexible approach. 13 Congress and
federal policymakers, for example, have promulgated law that is adaptive to the
technology and political economy of telecommunications and cable television.
Specifically with regards to the latter, they have responded to the distinctly local
nature of the cable technology by ratifying a limited but pivotal role for local
authorities.14
This argument addresses the structure of public communications law
administration. The lack of local physical access to the diverse applications and
content that comprise the Internet, I argue, makes positive local intervention in
broadband service far more essential than it was for the media technologies of
the past two centuries. State restrictions on local participation would do nothing
but slow the Internet's integration into public life and stifle growth. Courts and
lawmakers, I argue, should take steps to preserve or enlarge local autonomy and
authority in this field.
This Article is organized into four parts. Part II introduces the technology
and political economy of broadband localism. It explains the importance of the
last-mile to users' online experiences, elaborates the ways in which providers
and municipalities supply broadband access, and outlines Congress's recent
effort in the Recovery Act to encourage municipal broadband. In short, I show
that local governments have been pivotal to the development of broadband
service, not as regulators, but as infrastructure owners, service providers, and
incubators.
Part III considers the legal status of state restrictions on municipal
broadband in light of the Supreme Court's treatment of similar restrictions in
the analogous but different legislative field of telecommunications. The Court
has reasoned that, as creatures of the state, local governments are barred from
doing anything without unequivocal authorization from their parent states. I
argue here that this rigid and old creature-of-the-state view is at odds with
12

See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE

WILLIAM F. OGBURN, ON CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE: SELECTED PAPERS

24 (1999);

30-31 (Otis

Dudley Duncan ed., 1964).
13 See Laurie Reynolds, A Role for Local Government Law in Federal-State-Local
Disputes, 43 URB. LAW. 977, 983-87 (2011). See generally Nestor M. Davidson,
Cooperative Localism: Federal-LocalCollaborationin an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA.
L. REv. 959 (2007); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of FederalLaw to
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201
(1999); Hills, Jr., supra note 7.
14

See infra Part IV.D.
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contemporary reality; it overlooks the extent to which the federal government
has carved out a major positive role for local governments in the administration
of public law in a wide array of legislative fields. This prevailing view, I argue,
has nevertheless infected some states' perceptions about the relative authority of
municipalities to participate in the broadband market and, as a result, forestalled
innovation.
Part V illustrates the ways in which Congress and the courts have relied on
local authorities in the regulation of telecommunications and cable service. This
history, I show, evinces a recognition that local governments ought to have a
pivotal, if sometimes limited, role in the administration of communications law.
In Part V, I show that the emergent broadband localism owes something to this
history. The technology and political economy of broadband service, I show,
has forced Congress and policymakers to carve out a major role for local
intervention in the administration of broadband today. And while much remains
underdeveloped at this point, I explain, a unified federal-local approach to
broadband is materializing. This includes mechanisms that encourage municipal
autonomy and accountability, support adoption programs for all communities,
and boost competition. I conclude by asserting that Congress should further
elaborate these objectives in federal law in the near future.
II. THE NEW BROADBAND LOCALISM
A. Out of the Clouds
It is nearly axiomatic today that the Internet accommodates and enlarges
communicative capacities once repressed by the technological limits and
political economy of twentieth century mass media. This conventional view
posits that users actualize their authentic communicative capacities on the
Internet more than when telegraphy or broadcasting first became commercially
available. 15 More generally, this view holds, Internet-enabled communications
have helped to instigate dramatic world historical events in North Africa and
Eastern Europe, 16 as well as more subtle but no less systematic transformations
in the way we communicate in our daily lives with family, friends, and

15

See YocHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION

TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 52-54 (2006).

16See id. at 266; Philip N. Howard, et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the
Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring? 2 (Project on Info. Tech. & Political Islam,
Working

Paper No.

2011.1,

2011), available at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/12947477/

publications/201 1_Howard-Duffy-Freelon-Hussain-Mari-MazaidjpITPI.pdf. But see Navid
Hassanpour,

Media Disruption Exacerbates Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence from

Mubarak's Natural Experiment 1-3 (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n Annual Meeting Paper, 2011),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1903351 &download=yes##.
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coworkers. 17 Users can, at once, organize against tyrants and fine-tune their
public social media profiles. Developments in "cloud" computing and mobile
communication technologies have deepened many consumers' sense of selfpossession.
It is easy to think that John Perry Barlow's polemic of fifteen years ago
about a sovereign Internet uncontrolled by "flesh-and-steel" giants of commerce
and government has won the day. 18 After all, many of us are now just tapping
effortlessly between our applications, documents, music, and photos without
compunction about the earthly impediments of storage and place. The sky
seems to be the limit.
Very recent developments in the broadband and Internet consumer markets,
however, belie the romance of this popular brand of Internet
transcendentalism. 19 The quality of users' broadband transmission service
depends on where they live and which company provides their service. Courts
are resolving jurisdictional disputes by attending to the tried-and-true
conventions of time and place. 20 Internet service providers and web-based
application administrators can now pinpoint each user's physical location
almost anywhere around the world with remarkable precision. The proverbial
cloud in which so much of our online stuff is now stored is really an archipelago
of large data storage centers and server farms in places like Boardman, Oregon,
and Maiden, North Carolina. 2 1 They take up acres of space and emit greenhouse
gases in much the same way as many of the "flesh-and-steel" businesses that
Barlow decried fifteen years ago. Cloud computing centers apparently produce
so much energy that some industry leaders are considering using them as
22
furnaces.

17

See Barry Wellman et al., The Social Affordances of the Internet for Networked
Individualism,
8 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC'N, 15-16 (Apr. 2003).
18
Email from John Perry Barlow, Co-Founder, Elec. Frontier Found., to
barlow@eff.org (Feb. 9, 1996, 17:16 PM) (https://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Intemet censorship
_bills/barlow_0296.declaration). But see JACK GOLDSMITH & Tim WU, WHO CONTROLS THE
INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 20-22 (2006); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Technology andInternetJurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1951, 1956 (2005).
19 The amended
Communications Act defines broadband or "advanced
telecommunications capability" as "high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications
capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video telecommunications using any technology." 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).
20
See, e.g., Chlo6 v. Queen Bee, 616 F.3d 158, 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2010).
21 See, e.g., Robert McMillan, Wired Scores Exclusive Aerial Photos of Apple's 'Area
i51),
WIRED.COM (Apr. 6, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/04/
apples-secret-data-center/; Rich Miller, Amazon Building Large Data Center in Oregon,
DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 7, 2008, 9:19 AM), http://www.datacenterknowledge.
com/archives/2008/11/07/amazon-building-large-data-center-in-oregon/.
22
See Jill Duffy, Can In-Home Data Centers Keep Us Warm?, PCMAG.COM (Aug. 2,
2011, 10:39 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2390261,00.asp.
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Cloud computing is a misnomer. Users' Internet experiences depend on the
bandwidth capacity and speed of transmission cables, as well as the location of
towers.23 The Internet, to be sure, continues to be an interconnected global
network of networks. Its constituent routers, servers, and storage caches are
distributed so widely that most users do not know or need to worry about the
path or timeliness of the transmissions on which their online experiences
depend. 24 But the multitudes of facilities through which Internet transmissions
pass at any given moment are located in some physical place in which locally
contingent stakeholders have conflicting interests to negotiate. 2 5 You need not
look much further than Iran, Egypt, and Syria, where, for at least a short period
of time, their governments blocked some or all Internet traffic into and out of
their countries by command or some form of coercion. 26 Or consider the
converse. South Korea touts the fastest and most reliable broadband networks in
the world; users there are capable of doing more things online than anywhere
27
else.

B. All BroadbandIs Local
Not unlike the transformation of the market for electricity in the nineteenth
century, 2 8 the quality of transmission connections today is increasingly a
function of the location and condition of physical facilities. 29 Residency,

23 A user requires, for example, at least an Internet connection speed of four megabits
per second in order to simultaneously watch a video and engage in basic web-browsing and
email. Sixth Broadband Deployment Rep., 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9559 (2010) (indicating that
4.0 Mbps "is the minimum speed required to stream a high-quality... video while leaving
bandwidth for basic web browsing and e-mail").
sufficient
24
See Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself
and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 343, 347-51 (2008).
Together,
25
1d. at 351-53.
26 Those countries have learned the hard way that shutting down access to the Internet
accelerates revolutionary upheaval rather than slowing it down. See Hassanpour, supra note
16, at 1-3.
27 Press Release, Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., OECD Broadband Statistics
2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34225
(Dec.
42800196 _1_1 1,00.htm.
28

See NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO

9-12 (2008).
GOOGLE
29
That transmission is treated differently than content is a feature of what legal
scholars and engineers have referred to as the "layered" or modular architecture of the
Internet. At the bottom of this "IP stack" is the transmission layer. The separate protocols
and technologies that enable communication between the different networks (i.e., the
Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol) operate above this "bottom layer."
And running atop the IP stack are the applications and content for which most users access
the Internet.
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therefore, matters quite a lot to the kinds of online experiences that users have. 30
This broadband localism is the next phase in the Internet's maturation from the
boutique technological curiosity of a generation ago to a fully integrated and
31
contested public resource.
Broadband network owners know this, as they leverage their formidable
market position in local areas. Almost five years ago, for example, Comcast
engaged in surreptitious content-based blocking of subscribers' Internet
connections in certain local markets, effectively controlling the online resources
to which subscribers in those areas could have access. Before getting rebuked
by the Florida Attorney General 32 and then the Federal Communications
33
Commission (FCC) for violating the agency's "Open Internet" principles,
Comcast claimed that such network management practices were necessary to
maintain the integrity of service for all local subscribers. 34 Heavy use of the
network by a small and active number of35file-sharers, it claimed, degraded
service for most other users in the same area.
Providers, however, are not the only ones who have picked up on the
promise of the new broadband localism. Google, the content and advertising
behemoth, has as well. In 2010, the company launched a one billion dollar Fiber
for Communities program that would build-out ultra-high-speed infrastructure
in one or two cities. 36 There is a good case to be made that, with the program,
30

Cf James B. Speta, Handicappingthe Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open
Access Rules for BroadbandPlatforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 40-41 (2000); see also JOHN
POSTILL, LOCALIZING THE INTERNET: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 101-10 (2011).

31 Cf John Palfrey, Four Phases of Internet Regulation, 77 SOC. RES. 981, 981, 991-93
(2010); Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic Legitimacy, 62 FED. COMM.
235 (2010).
L.J. 205,
32
Assurance of Voluntary Compliance at 6-7, In re Comcast Corporation (Aug. 29,
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/MRAYL07-3-1132),
(No.
2008)
7J4RL3/$file/ComcastAVC.pdf.
33
See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028,
13,028
(2008).
34
Public outrage moved the FCC to enjoin the company from engaging in such
blocking without giving subscribers notice. Id. Two years later, Comcast persuaded a D.C.
Circuit panel that, while some of its network management techniques were unsavory, the
FCC did not have the jurisdictional authority to enjoin those practices. See Comcast Corp. v.
FCC,35579 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Today, major broadband providers have abandoned more secret content controls for
usage caps. Karl Bode, AT&T Caps Have Arrived, DSLREPORTS.COM (May 2, 2011),
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/114012. They also are explicitly considering ways to
bundle their transmission service with exclusive applications and content. See, e.g., Todd
Spangler, Xbox Lights Up Epix, YouTube in Guide Overhaul, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Dec. 5,
2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.multichannel.com/article/477423-XboxLightsUpEpixYouTube InGuideOverhaul.php.
36Julie Scharper, City Hopes to Boost Case to Google by Mapping Conduits,
BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 8, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-09-08/newslbs-mdgoogle-fiber-conduit-20100908_1_google-czar-tom-loveland-google-fiber.
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Google is dramatically foiling claims by the major providers that the cost of
ultra-high-speed infrastructure development is too high right now. After all,
until this effort, the company did not have any significant presence in the
residential broadband service market.
No matter their real motivations, in February 2010, Google invited local
government officials across the country to submit applications on behalf of their
communities to participate. The winner would collaborate with Google's
engineers to provide Internet access at one gigabit per second directly to
residents' homes at competitive prices. At such speeds, civic leaders and local
elected officials would have at their disposal an unprecedented resource that
could accommodate the next generation of interactive and immersive Internet
37
applications and services for residents and create the Gigabit City.
One month later, Google received more than 1,100 applications from
enthusiastic local communities across the country. 38 City officials and civic
leaders could not contain their excitement, doing anything and everything to
woo Google. Some even renamed themselves in honor of the Internet search
39
and advertising giant.
Kansas City, Kansas became the first winner of the Fiber for Communities
sweepstakes in March 2011. Hours after the announcement, city officials and
civic leaders there were giddily musing about major transformations of
government administration, entrepreneurship, education, research, healthcare,
and civic life generally in the city. Community leaders and activists have voiced
40
concerns about cost barriers for some low-income communities in the city.
Others remain unsure that one gigabit-per-second speed delivers anything more
than buzz for Google. 4 1 But most observers are confident that ultra-high-speed
broadband will yield unprecedented benefits. They just do not know what they
42
will be yet.

37

See generally THE BRAINZOOMING GRP. & Soc. MEDIA CLUB OF KAN. CITY,
BUILDING THE GIGABIT CITY: BRAINZOOMING A GOOGLE FIBER ROADMAP (2011), available
at http://brainzooming.com/files/building-the-gigabit-city-report-nov- 10-2011-release- 1.pdf.
[hereinafter THE BRA1NZOOMING GRP.].
38
Scharper, supra note 36.
39
John D. Sutter, Topeka 'Renames' Itself 'Google, Kansas,' CNN.COM (Mar. 2,
2010),
http://articIes.cnn.com/2010-03-02/tech/google.kansas.topekal_google-internetcapital-city?_s=PM:TECH.
40
See Alyson Raletz, Reardon Concerned Not Everyone Can Afford Google Project,
KANSAS CITY Bus. J. (June 7, 2011, 2:51 PM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/kansascity/blog/
2011/06/reardon-google-kansas-city-deploy.html.
41 See, e.g., Craig Settles, You've Got a Gigabit Network, So Now What?, GIGAOM
(Nov. 12, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://GigaOm.com/broadband/youve-got-a-gigabit-network-sonow-what/.
42
See THE BRAINZOOMING GRP., supra note 37, at 2.
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Google has also assured other eager cities that they will continue to look for
opportunities to develop fiber-optic networks across the country. 43 In May of
the same year, for example, it expanded its Kansas project to include the larger
Kansas City across the river in Missouri.
For what it is worth, the Kansas Cities are not alone to explore municipal
broadband. A coalition of twenty-eight major U.S. universities has promised to
44
build ultra-high-speed computer networks in their respective communities.
The project, called Gig.U, is an effort to entice technology companies involved
in health care, energy, and telecommunications to headquarter near research
universities across the country. Community leaders and local cooperatives are
initiating similar, smaller scale projects like these across the country by
enlisting the diverse and unique competencies of local anchor institutions,
45
businesses, and residents.
C. Municipal Broadband
Local governments are lighting the spark for broadband infrastructure
build-out. They are mobilizing an array of local anchor institutions and
resources to bring service to residents. That they do this is no surprise. After all,
local governments are best suited to appreciate the characteristics or "terroir"
46
that distinguish their constituents from others.
These local governments are not waiting for the initiative of private
incumbent providers. Today, about 133 U.S. localities of all sizes own town-or
city-wide fiber or cable networks. 47 Hundreds more rely on broadband
43

See Ultra High-Speed BroadbandIs Coming to Kansas City, Kansas, GOOGLE FIBER
BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011), http://googlefiberblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/ultra-high-speedbroadband-is-coming-to.html.
44 John Markoff, Colleges Join Planfor Faster Computer Networks, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/science/27gig. html? r= 1.
45

See, e.g., Dave Peters, Map Shows Co-Ops Lead Charge on Rural Broadband,

(Dec. 30, 2011, 12:05 PM), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/
special/columns/ground-level/archive/2011/12/map-shows-co-ops-lead-charge-on-ruralbroadband.shtml; Bruce Lincoln, Advancing Community Broadband: Solving the Digital
Divide Problem with Social Enterprise (Mar. 18, 2011) (presentation at Georgetown
University), http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/ filemgr?file id=73839. 1.
46 The evocative concept of "terroir" is generally reserved for geology, viticulture, and
architecture. See generally JAMES E. WILSON, TERROIR (Sue Jamieson et al. eds., 1999);
FACULTY OF DESIGN, ARCHITECTURE & BUILDING, UNIV. OF TECH. SYDNEY, TERROIR:
COSMOPOLITAN GROUND (Scott Balmforth & Gerard Reinmuth eds., 2007).
47
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CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL, PUBLICLY OWNED BROADBAND NETWORKS: AVERTING THE
LOOMING BROADBAND MONOPOLY 1 (2011), http://muninetworks.org/reports/publicty-

owned-broadband-networks-averting-looming-broadband-monopoly. Localities in England,
Spain, the Netherlands, and Japan also have all built or supported the building of successful
citywide broadband networks. See Costas Troulos & Vasilis Maglaris, Factors Determining
Municipal Broadband Strategies Across Europe, 35 TELECOMM. POL'Y 842, 843 (2011),
availableat http://campus.lostfocus.org/dikshie/TelecommunicationsPolicy/2011/
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connections to administer public services, using it, for example, to manage the
electrical grid or vehicular traffic. Many other local communities invest in
municipal broadband infrastructure to fill the gap in service between haves and
have-nots, 4 8 as well as to protect residents from the creeping rise in prices of
incumbent providers' service. 4 9 Municipalities also build broadband
infrastructure to make businesses there more adaptive to shifting market
demands, hospitals more responsive to patients' needs, and schools superior
resources for students and teachers. It is likely that local broadband
development, like other public works projects, also spurs short-term economic
50
growth no matter whether anyone uses the Internet.
Local governments, moreover, have adopted operational models that reflect
local needs and contingencies. 5 1 Some, for example, operate their own
networks. Chattanooga, Tennessee touts the most successful of these, owning
52
and operating the largest city-wide fiber-optic network in the country.
Residents living downtown, in trailer parks, and area farms receive one-gigabitper-second service. 53 This network has enabled the city's Electric Power Board
(EPB) to experiment with the administration of the electrical grid. The EPB has
asserted that the fiber-optic network was built to service the new smart-grid
54
more than Internet access.
Most municipalities that have invested in broadband infrastructure,
however, share ownership or operational control with a private provider. This
public-private approach has been used in an array of localities, but has been

volume35issue9/science_006.pdf.
48
See Brian Stelter, Newly Flush, Local TV Newscasts Are Expanding, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2011, atB1.
49
See Jie Jenny Zou, Faster Internet Service Fuels Growth at West Virginia
Community Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 25, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/
Faster-Intemet-Service-Fuels/ 129137/.
50
See, e.g., Joan Engebretson, Comcast Study: BroadbandBoosts Real Estate Metrics,
CONNECTED PLANET (Sept. 26, 2011), http://edmondsbeacon.villagesoup.com/news/story/
City-owned-fiber-optics-starting-to-pay-off/210787?cid=2003080; Pat Ratliff, City Owned
Fiber-Optics Starting to Pay Off, EDMONDS
BEACON
(Aug. 26, 2010),
http://edmondsbeacon.villagesoup.com/news/story/City-owned-fiber-optics-starting-to-payoff/210787?cid=2003080.
51 This is to say nothing of the ways in which municipalities are using high-speed
broadband as a way of incubating novel, civic-minded applications.
52
MITCHELL, supranote 47, at 2.
53
Phil Shapiro, Chattanooga'sInnovation Culture, COMMUNITY VOICES (Jan. 5, 2012,
1:14 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/246298/chattanoogasinnovationculture.html.
54 See Smart Grid Electric Power, ELECTRIC POWER BOARD, https://www.epb.net/
power/home/products/smart-grid/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
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particularly popular in larger cities. 55 Some finance the development of the
broadband infrastructure, only to have the system administered by a private
provider. The city of Decatur, Georgia, for example, built its own wireless
network in 2007 and contracted out its administration to a private provider that
offers both free and fee-based service to residents. 56 Similarly, Seattle recently
negotiated a lease with Comcast to make high-speed Internet service available
to businesses occupying a historic downtown neighborhood. 5 7 Comcast
essentially pays rent to the city for access to the fiber-optic cables located under
streets and alongside utility equipment already undergoing improvement. 58
Seattle awarded the bid to attract technology companies to the historic
59
neighborhood.
Many more communities rely on an anchor-tenant model for their local
broadband networks. This arrangement consists of a privately owned backbone
network from which the municipality purchases a minimum level of services.
The municipality, in turn, awards the private provider use of public rights-ofway and other resources. Minneapolis' anchor-tenant collaboration with USI
Wireless is among the most well-regarded municipally-supported WiFi
broadband networks in the United States. 60 The city pays USI a regular annual
fee. 6 1 USI, in turn, is to reallocate five percent of its net revenues to a "Digital
55

See Joshua Breitbart, The PhiladelphiaStory: Learning from a Municipal Wireless

Pioneer, NEW AM. FOUND. 35-41 (2007), http://www.newamerica.net/files/Nafmigration/
NAF PhilWirelessreport.pdf.
56Esme Vos, Decatur, GA Seeks ISP to Run Municipal Wireless Network,
MLYNiWIRELESS (June 17, 2011), http:/,h',wv.muniwireless.coni/201 1/06/17/ decatur-seeks isp-to-run-municipal-wirelessnetwork/?utmsource=feedbumer&utmmedium-feed&utm_
campaign=Feed%3A+muniwireless+%28MuniWireless%29&utmcontent-Google+
Feedfetcher.
57
David Kreuger, City Bringing Fiber-Optic Broadband to Pioneer Square,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 23, 2011, 7:03 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmlllocalnews/
2015130291 _broadband24m.html; J.B. Wogan, Comcast, Metro City Plan Pioneer Square
Broadband, SEATTLE TIMES (June 15, 2011, 9:04 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/localnews/2015332192_cablel6m.html.
58
See Greg Lamm, Comcast Lands PioneerSquare Internet Contract, Onehub Moving
in from Bellevue, TECHFLASH (June 15, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://techflash.com/seattle/
2011/06/comcast-wins-pioneer-sq-fiber-optic-bid.html.
59
Wogan, supra note 57.
60
Douglas Gorney, Minneapolis Unplugged, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2010, 8:00 AM),
www.theatlantic.com/special-report/ the-future-of-the-city/archive/2010/06/ minneapolis
-unplugged/57676/; Andrew Lavallee, A Second Look at Citywide WiFi, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
8, 2008), online.wsj.com/article/SB 122840941903779747.html; New Business Models Said
Key to Successful Municipal Wi-Fi, COMM. DAILY (June 30, 2008); WIRELESS MINNEAPOLIS
MUNICIPAL BROADBAND INITIATIVE: BUSINESS CASE, VERSION 3.0, (2006), available at
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@bis/documents/webcontent/convert-2
77329.pdf.
61 Under the terms of the contract, the City of Minneapolis pays the private owner of
the network (in this case, USI Wireless) a minimum of $1.25 million annually for services
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Inclusion Fund" and provide residents with free access in local parks and
technology centers. 62 Five percent of the network's nodes are public
"hotspots." 63 The result has been near-complete coverage in metropolitan
64
Minneapolis and a model for other cities.
Not all operational models have been successful, however. The franchise
model for municipal broadband, for example, consists of a privately owned and
65
operated, for-profit network owner that does not have the city as a customer.
To make the enterprise sustainable, the city grants the private company use of
public assets or rights-of-way for a limited period of time. The private provider
compensates the city for the use. Under these terms, the risk of failure for the
city is always low because the arrangement does not require public investment
or involvement. On the other hand, the benefits are modest, with revenue only
coming from nominal usage fees. With little buy-in, participating cities do not
have much influence over network coverage, quality of service, or prices.
The largest of cities have pursued a diversity of deployment strategies. In
collaboration with Comcast, for example, Chicago announced an "Internet
Essentials" program aimed at providing high-speed broadband service to
families of public school students in the city who qualify for free school
lunches. 66 New York City, meanwhile, has initiated an ambitious plan to
introduce free Wi-Fi through private sector partnerships in city parks, public
spaces, and specially-targeted improvement districts. 67 The city also intends to
68
increase broadband adoption in underserved areas.
The point of all of this is that municipal entrepreneurship of the sort found
in Chattanooga, Decatur, Seattle, Minneapolis, Chicago, and New York show
great promise because of the unique institutional competence that local
over the ten-year life of the contract. Marguerite Reardon, New Business Models for
Citywide Wi-Fi, CNET NEWS (Mar. 17, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/83011078462 3-9893450-7.html.
-Gomey, supra note 60.
63

Id.

64

See id. Oklahoma City's own broadband network, which covers 95% of the city,
emulates the one in Minneapolis. See William G. Korver, Relaunched Oklahoma City Wi-Fi
Network Showcases City-Services Model, BROADBANDBREAKFAST.COM (Aug. 6, 2008),
http://broadbandbreakfast.com/2008/08/relaunched-oklahoma-city-wi-fi-networkshowcases-cityservice-model/.
65

see, e.g., Termination Agreement, MUNIWIRELESS, 1, http://www.muniwireless.com/

wp-content/uploads/2008/07/do_23241 .pdf.
66
Fran Spielman, Low-Income Chicago Students to Get Low-Cost Broadband, CHI.
SuN-TIMES (Sept. 11, 2011, 12:22 AM), http://www.suntimes.com/news/education/
This program
5693127-418/low-income-chicago-students-to-get-low-cost-broadband.html.
is substantially like one recently launched by the FCC. See infra note 240 and accompanying
text.
67
See Andrew Berg, AT&T Launches Wi-Fi in NYC Parks, WIRELESS WEEK (June 9,
http://www.wirelessweek.com/News/2011/06/ATT-launches-wi-fi--NYC-Parks/.
2011),
68
Id
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governments bring to bear. Municipalities are familiar with local needs and
contingencies and are immediately accountable to voters. 69 They do not have
the pecuniary or proprietary interest to mediate subscriber access to Internet
content in the way that private providers demonstrably do. Their motivations
may not always be pure, but they are accountable to their local communities in
70
ways that legitimize their interventions.
D. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
In 2009, Congress gave a major boost to these community initiated projects
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 7 1 In that statute,
Congress delegated the general authority to encourage universal broadband
deployment to the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) in the Agriculture Department
and the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA) in
the Commerce Department. 72 Through these grant-making programs, Congress
committed a remarkable $7.2 billion to local community broadband projects and
"middle-mile" across the country in order to jolt local economies back to life. 7 3
Congress charged the NTIA and RUS the responsibility of administering
broadband-related financing programs in direct collaboration with local
governments and the FCC. 74 Through the Recovery Act, Congress gave NTIA
the authority to create the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program
(BTOP) through which75 the agency awards competitive grants to "unserved" or
"underserved" areas.
These grants were to be made to states and
municipalities, as well as nonprofit organizations, foundations, corporations,
and associations, and other civic organizations. 76 Awardees, in turn, could use
such grants to acquire physical equipment, technology, and software to support

69

Cf Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253,

264 (2004); Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REv. 1113, 1117-18 (2007);
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism andLawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 639-40 (2001).
70
See, e.g., Alabama City Votes Overwhelmingly to Build Municipal Fiber Network,
ST. TELEPHONE REG. REP. (Aug. 20, 2010); PETER OLAF LOOMs, MAKING TELEVISION
ACCESSIBLE (Nov. 2011), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/sis/PwDs/Documents/Making TVAccessible-Final-WithAltTextlnserted.pdf
71 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009) [hereinafter Recovery Act].
72
73

See 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2011).

See Recovery Act, 123 Stat. at 128; NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, EXPANDING BROADBAND ACCESS AND ADOPTION IN COMMUNITIES ACROSS
AMERICA: OVERVIEW OF GRANT AWARDS 2 (2010), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/

ntia-report on btop_121422010_0.pdf; UTP Broadband Initiatives Program Main, USDA
RURAL DEV., http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/utpbip.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
74 Recovery Act, 123 Stat. at 127, 128.
75 Recovery Act, § 600 1(a)(1)-(2).
76
See id. § 6001(e)(1)(A)-(B).
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public computing centers in libraries and community colleges, and generally to
77
facilitate universal service.
The program administered by the RUS, the Broadband Initiatives Program
(BIP), was smaller. Through it, Congress expanded the lending authority of
RUS. It also gave the agency the authority to make grants and loan/grant
combinations to facilitate broadband deployment in rural areas. 78
Since their creation over two years ago, these two Recovery Act programs
have funded the construction of broadband network infrastructure, the
development of public computer centers, and sustainable broadband adoption
projects in areas in which broadband access and use are low. The NTIA, which
Congress charged with spending most of this money, has invested about four
billion dollars in 233 local infrastructure development projects through BTOP. 79
Through BIP, RUS has awarded three-and-a-half billion dollars in grants and
loans to 320 local broadband infrastructure projects in rural communities across
80
the country.
Grantees for the program came from all fifty states, the territories, and the
District of Columbia. About half, if not most, of the awardees have been
municipalities, counties, local nongovernmental nonprofit cooperatives and
institutions, and some states. These investments already have had a remarkable
effect on public life. For example, West Virginia, today, is one of the five most
well-connected states in the country after the state received $126 million in
Recovery grants to expand broadband availability. 81 Most of this funding has
been directed at schools and libraries, and, since, has demonstrably encouraged
providers to build local networks at lower cost, thus attracting more people to
82
the state.
The West Virginia story is just one of hundreds. Similar improvements are
occurring across the country.83 BTOP infrastructure projects are building and
77
78
79

See id. § 6001(g)()--(2); S. REP. No. 111-3, at 12 (2009).
See Recovery Act, 123 Stat. at 118-19.
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supplying high-speed, high-capacity broadband connections to schools,
hospitals, and other anchor institutions. Investment in "middle mile" facilities
has also spurred private-sector investment in high-quality residential and
commercial service.
E. Experimentalism,Empiricism, andLaw
Local communities and Congress have at least three good reasons to be
emphatic in their support of municipal broadband. First, slower Internet
connections are costlier than faster ones. 84 Second, users are more productive
with every incremental increase in broadband speed.8 5 Third, the quality of
broadband access seems to have a positive86impact on businesses' and residents'
willingness to stay or settle in the locality.
This data is relatively new, however, and some questions remain
unanswered. Alone, data on adoption and access, for example, are not sufficient
measures of success. Policymakers will want to know which factors most
correlate with investments in adoption and access, whether returns on public
and how far public investment
investment in municipal broadband are worth it,
87
failure.
market
a
effectively
is
can redress what
These empirical questions, however, should not distract us from the
normative, structural, and legal problems at issue. Of course, attention to the
data as such is important but, at this "constitutive moment" in the development
of broadband technology, it is premature. 88 It is unrelated to the first-order
structural questions of whether local governments can, may, or should
experiment with supplying broadband service. As I show above, local officials
across the country already are bringing to bear their unique institutional
competence to deliver service to resident users. They are articulating purposes
and choosing operational models that ostensibly make sense for their residents.
84

See Quentin Fottrell, The High Costs of a Slow Internet Connection, PAY DIRT (Oct.

12, 2011, 10:57 AM), http://blogs.smartmoney.com/paydirt/2011/10/12/the-high-costs-of-a&link-SMhomeblogsum.
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85
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86
See Zou, supra note 49.
87
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L.J. 343, 352-53 (2010). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has
an abundance of information on data relating to subscription rates, usage, pricing,
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They are deciding which parts of their communities require the most urgent
interventions, and fitting interventions to the needs of their constituencies.
Local governments have been doing all of this independently, without
prodding or guidance from states or the federal government. (Of course, since
implementation of the ARRA, local efforts have become easier.) I argue here
that, at a minimum, local governments ought to have the autonomous authority
to be experimental and entrepreneurial. This is a normative and structural claim,
not an empirical one. It is an argument that current law ought to be flexible
enough to accommodate the new broadband localism. 8 9
Part III below takes up this point by presenting and then critiquing the
prevailing but misguided conception of plenary state authority over local
governments. This view, as advocated by the Supreme Court, for example, fails
to appreciate the possibility for local experimentation and entrepreneurship, and
the ways in which local governments are sometimes best suited to administering
public law in a variety of fields. Similarly, the Court has failed to appreciate
Congress's power to preempt state action under the Supremacy Clause. The
example of the new broadband localism vividly illustrates the point. In Part
Two below, I show that the formal commitment to state plenary authority over
local governments is outdated, purely aesthetic, and ill-suited to contemporary
realities.
III. STATES GETTING IN THE WAY
A. State Statutory Restrictions on Broadband
Private providers have a strong interest in keeping municipal broadband at
bay. They accordingly have been lobbying state legislators with varying success
to enact limits or flat-out bans. 90 They are not waiting for the empirical data
about the merits of local government participation.
Some states have resisted such pressures and, to the contrary, have been
quite active in deploying broadband infrastructure for their residents.
Massachusetts, for example, recently launched an effort to bring low-cost highspeed Internet access to all homes, businesses, and public buildings in the

891 assume throughout that the advantages of local public investment in and
administration of broadband infrastructure ought to be encouraged as a matter of policy.
That assumption will be proven right or wrong in the near future, of course, but the chance
of success is enough to encourage local entrepreneurship and experimentation.
90
See Lynne Klaft, BroadbandProject to Blanket the State, WORCESTER TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.telegram.com/article/20111113/NEWS/i11119549/
1101/local. They also have engaged in litigation to delay build-outs and buy time to develop
their own competing infrastructure. See, e.g., Bridgewater Tel. Co. v. City of Monticello,
765 N.W.2d 905, 915-16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Christopher Rhoads, Cities Start Own
Efforts to Speed Up Broadband,WALL ST. J., May 19, 2008, at Al.
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state. 9 1 The Massachusetts Broadband Institute collaborated with the state
Department of Transportation to lay miles of "middle-mile" fiber-optic cable
across the state. 92 Observers expect it to provide broadband service to over 120
cities and towns in the western and northern central parts of the state that have
93
yet to have such reliable service.
But there is also a strong trend in the opposite direction. Today, nineteen
states restrict municipal broadband in some way. At least Arkansas, Nebraska,
and Texas appear to have absolute bans. 94 North Carolina, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia impose bans but leave some localities with potential
authority. 95 Eleven states impose barriers that make municipal broadband
prohibitive if not difficult to develop. They require, for example, local
governments to hold public hearings or local referenda resulting in
supermajority support for government owned or operated service. 9 6 Some also
require municipalities to have large amounts of cash-on-hand or pay taxes.
97
None of these impose similar requirements on private providers.
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted the most recent state
restriction in the country. In May 2011, it passed the Level Playing Field/Local
Government Competition Act, which effectively prevents local governments
from building or providing the market for residential broadband.98 The law
forbids municipal operators from offering low introductory prices to consumers
and requires municipalities to pay the taxes that would be applied to the same
network were it owned and operated by a private provider.99 The handful of
North Carolina cities already with full-fledged broadband networks, including

91 See Klaft, supra note 90.
92
93
94

See id.
See id
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95
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VA.

CODE ANN. § 15.2-1500 (West 2008).
96
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TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-52-601, 7-52-602 (2011) (requiring municipal provision of video
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97
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Matthew Lasar, North Carolina Enacts Pro-ISP, Anti-Municipal BroadbandLaw,
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Wilson and Salisbury, are exempted from the new law. 100 All other cities,
however, do not fare as well. Chapel Hill, for example, can only complete the
installation of cables in city offices that it intended to be part of a city-wide
municipal fiber-optic network.' 0 ' The law now makes it virtually impossible for
the city to extend to residents the high-speed network now available to city
workers.
City officials and activists for municipal broadband are displeased, to say
the least.1 02 Several North Carolina cities passed non-binding resolutions
opposing the new state measure. 10 3 Other critics blast the law as "a cable
monopoly protection bill" that harms the state's global competitiveness. 104
After all, by one measure, North Carolina has the lowest percentage of residents
with at least three megabits per second (Mbps) broadband service. 10 5
The most enthusiastic advocates of the North Carolina ban were the major
incumbent providers in the state, Time Warner Cable and CenturyLink. They
had a lot to gain from a law that would eliminate any further competition in the
residential broadband market. The North Carolina law is the culmination of four
10 6
years of their lobbying efforts.
Several other states have or are currently considering similar restrictions.
South Carolina passed one such law last summer, and, as of this writing, the
state legislatures in Georgia and Arkansas are also considering restrictions on
municipally owned or operated broadband infrastructure. In South Carolina,
100
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www.muninetworks.org/content/greensboro-passes-resolution-against-time-warner-cablebill-north-carolina; Christopher Mitchell, Another North Carolina Community Passes
Resolution Against Time Warner Cable Bill, COMMUNITY BROADBAND NETWORKS (Mar. 28,
2011), http://www.muninetworks.org/content/another-north-carolina-community-passesresolution-against-time-warner-cable-bill.
104
Heaton, supranote 100. See generallysupra note 103.
105
Broadband Facts: North CarolinaHas Worst Broadbandin the Country, SEATOA,
http://seatoa.org/2011-0404%20SEATOA%20BBND%20FACTSHEET.pdf, see also NC
Bill Restricting Municipal BroadbandEfforts Goes to the Governor, TECHJOURNAL (May 9,
2011), http://www.techjoumalsouth.com/2011/05/nc-bill-restricting-municipal-broadbandefforts-goes-to-the-governor/.
10 6 See Heaton, supra note 100; Lasar, supra note 99.
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AT&T has been advocating a bill that would allow counties to provide
broadband in unserved rural areas, but would also require local governments
across the state to abide by all of the same public laws and franchising rules as
private carriers when they compete. 10 7 The bill before the Georgia General
Assembly would do this as well. 10 8 The Arkansas legislature is poised to
expand current bans on municipal ownership of telecommunications to
broadband.' 0 9
Surely, states are imposing restrictions in response to the vigorous lobbying
of private carriers. But there are earnest policy reasons for them as well. Any
governmental meddling, critics contend, will distort the efficient operation of
the price mechanism. Municipally supported service, they explain, has an unfair
competitive advantage over private provider service because, among other
things, the former can pass along costs to taxpayers without paying taxes or
attending to the same market pressures. If cities insist on investing in such
networks, they argue, they should require these companies to be subject to the
same regulations to which private providers are subject.' 10
A majority of legislators in North Carolina seemed to be persuaded,
moreover, that municipal broadband in the state hinders the competitiveness of
private broadband network operators. Governor Bev Perdue did not sign or veto
the bill, even as she believed the bill would decrease the number of broadband
options for residents. 111
What is more, critics of municipal broadband argue, if consumers have
more networks from which to choose, each network owner will service fewer
subscribers and, as a result, have to charge subscribers higher prices. 112 In any
event, they further claim, the duplicative costs of municipal broadband
development projects are not justified because the quality of service on such
networks is often not any better than what is otherwise available in the

10 7 See

H.R. 3508,
119th
Gen.
Assemb.
(S.C.
2012),
available
at
http://scstatehouse.gov/sess 119_2011-2012/bills/3508.htm; Phil Sarata, County: Bill Turns
Back Clock on Broadband, TIMES & DEMOCRAT (Mar. 23, 2011, 2:30 AM),
http://thetandd.comlbusiness/article_c438af24-5507- 11 eO-a9a4-001 cc4cOO2e.html#ixzzlch
kifESB.
108 S. 313, 151 st Gen. Assemb. (Ga. 2012), availableat http://www.legis.ga.gov/
legislation/20112012/118556.pdf, see also New Round of Municipal BroadbandFight Starts
at Georgia Legislature, COMM. DAILY (Feb. 3, 2012).
109
See H.R. 2033, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011), availableat http://
www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2011/2011 R/Acts/Act 1050.pdf.
110 See id.

111 Lasar, supra note 99; Marcus Trathen, Setting the Record Straight on the North
CarolinaLevel PlayingFieldBill, ARsTECHNICA (May 19, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/05/setting-the-record-straight-on-the-north-carolina-levelplaying-field-bill/.
1 12
Government Overbuilds Said to Be Waste ofResources Supporters Disagree,29 ST.
TELEPHONE REG. REP., June 10, 2011.
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market."13 Millions of government grants and loans have been directed at
municipal build-out projects in localities where the majority of households
already have access to cable broadband, DSL, or some wireless broadband
provider. 114 It would be a mistake, moreover, to allow major government
interventions in Internet infrastructure when the market for service and
application has demonstrably proven to be a cultural, political, and commercial
success.
B. The Assumption of Local Powerlessness
The policy debate about the costs and benefits of municipal broadband is
livelier than the debate about the legal status of state restrictions. The likeliest
reason for the relative quiet about the latter is the rule that states have plenary
authority over their resident municipalities. Local government powers, this
principle provides, do not exceed the explicit and specific ones given to them by
1
their parent states. 15
The Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on this rule over a century ago in
Hunter v. City of Pittsburghwhen, citing Judge John Dillon's Commentaries on
the Law of Municipal Corporations,116 it approved a Pennsylvania state statute
that consolidated two cities within the state over a referendum vote opposing
the consolidation by the majority of residents in one of those cities. 1 17 The
Court upheld the state legislature's decision to consolidate. Localities, it
11 8
explained, can only act pursuant to specific grants of authority from the state.
The referendum had no legal effect on the validity of the consolidation because
there was no clear and specific grant of authority from the state on the legal
pertinence of such a referendum. 119 Local governments, the Court reasoned, are
mere appendages of state government; they are incapable as a constitutional
matter of promulgating law or executing policy without "home rule" authority
120
or some other explicit legislative grant of power from the state legislature.

ll

3

1d"

114Id.

115 See, e.g., Bowers v. City of High Point, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287 (N.C. 1994).
116See JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§ 99 (5th ed. 1911).
'' 7 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1907); see also City of
Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 549 (1905) (citing cases). Courts
have approvingly referred to the creature-of-the-state principle as foundational. See, e.g.,
Wisc. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-08 (1991); Lawrence Cnty. v. LeadDeadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
also City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv. Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 428-29 (2002).
118Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178.
l1 9 See id. at 178-79.
1201Id.
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Dillon's Rule, even as old as it is, has important implications for municipal
broadband today. 121 Under one reading, it suggests that states may unqualifiedly
control how and whether localities may roll out service in the absence of state
authorization. The U.S. Supreme Court seven years ago found an occasion to
elaborate the point in the analogous context of state restrictions on local
government-owned
and
government-operated
telecommunications
infrastructure. In Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, the Court determined

that Missouri's restrictions on local telecommunications build-out and service
provisions were valid despite language in the amended Communications Act
that forbids states from prohibiting "the ability of any entity" to provide
telecommunications service. 122 This language, the Court explained, did not
preempt state restrictions on local governments. 123 The Court invoked Dillon's
Rule in its analysis, but did not cite it or any related authority. It took as given
that, as a practical matter, the political subdivisions of Missouri are not capable
of doing anything without state authorization or support. 124 The only legal
authority on which the Court explicitly relied was the clear statement rule; the
Court determined that there is nothing in the Communications Act that evinces
a clear intention on the part of Congress to preempt state restrictions on their
25
resident municipalities' broadband projects.1
C. Local Variation by Design
For many observers, Missouri MunicipalLeague stands squarely in the way

of the hundreds of potential municipal broadband projects in states with
ostensible restrictions on them. 126 Accordingly, in 2007, a handful of Senate
and House members sponsored a bill to preempt state limits on municipal
121 But see David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2255, 2290
(2003); Diller, supra note 69, at 1126-27.
122 Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 128 (2004). The statute in its entirety

provides that: "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to
provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2006).
Plaintiff cities in Missouri Municipal League appealed an FCC determination that this
provision preempted state restrictions. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 128-30.
1231d. at 129.
124

125

See id. at 133.
See Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 130 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,

460 126
(1991)).

See, e.g., Matthew Dunne, Note, Let My People Go (Online): The Power of the FCC
to Preempt State Laws that ProhibitMunicipal Broadband, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, t 126
(2007); Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN. L.
REv. 1, 98-100 (2009). But see John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on
Competitive Broadband Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 110 (2009) (explaining that

Mo. Mun. League has not been as bad for municipal broadband as some critics have made
out because only one-third of states have such restrictions).
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broadband. 12 7 The Community Broadband Act would "preserve the ability of
local governments to provide broadband capability and services." 128 Written in
this way, the bill's drafters wanted to make it unequivocally plain that state
restrictions on broadband would not stand. 129 The bill, however, never made it
130
to a vote in either chamber.
For advocates and opponents of municipal broadband alike, the lack of
action on the Community Broadband Act was significant. At worst, it left
untouched the Missouri Municipal League status quo-that is, something less
than a clear statement on state restrictions on municipal telecommunications, let
alone broadband.
The attention the Missouri Municipal League opinion has received from
legislators and commentators is reason alone to give that opinion more than
casual consideration.' 3 1 We can start with Justice Antonin Scalia's short
concurrence. There, he observed that the Court did not have to decide whether
municipalities may limit or enlarge their own power to provide
telecommunications service. 132 That question, he explained, was not presented
to the Court. The clear statement rule, he argued, did all of the necessary
33
analytical work. 1

The Court, of course, did not heed Justice Scalia's advice. To the contrary,
the question of local ability played a significant role in the opinion. At least as
evinced by the structure of the opinion, the Missouri MunicipalLeague Court's
application of the clear statement rule was an afterthought, occupying less than
one page at the very end of the sixteen page majority opinion. The clear
127

Dunne, supra note 126, at 1139.
128S. 1853, 110th Cong. (2008) (emphasis added); see also H.R. 3281, 11 0th Cong.
(2007).
129 First, the bill would have explicitly "preserve[d]" a presumably preexisting "ability"
in "local governments to provide broadband capability and services." S.1853, 110th Cong.
(2008). Second, in its references to "local government" and "public provider," the proposed
language made it unequivocally clear that municipal broadband service may not be
obstructed by state law. H.R. 3281, 110th Cong. (2007).
130 The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the House Commerce
Committee never reported it out. The Senate Commerce Committee reported the bill to the
full Senate, but chamber leaders never put it to a vote. See S.1853, 110th Cong. (2008). 1 do
not take up here the clear statement rule or preemption analysis generally as they relate to
municipal broadband, but think it is ripe for further scholarly treatment.
131 The opinion has attracted the attention of able commentators for the past seven or so
years. These commentators have not directed their analysis so much at the Court's
consideration of Section 253(a), the 1996 Telecommunications Act, or communications law
generally as much as the Court's unwarranted aggrandizement of state authority over
resident local governments. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 13, at 1032; Annie Decker,
Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the State in Congressional Decision
Making, 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 321, 375-76 (2012). But see Dunne, supra note 126, at
1151.
132 Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
133 Id
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statement rule, it explained, was only "complementary" of the structural
34
considerations at play.1
The effectiveness of preemption, the Court reasoned, depends entirely on
each respective municipality's practical ability to provide telecommunications
service. 135 It elaborated this point by hypothesizing what it viewed as the three
worrisome consequences of preemption if it were to agree with the local
governments that the amended Communications Act preempted the state
restrictions on their authority. First, preemption would be ineffectual because
municipalities do not have an organic ability to provide telecommunications
service that does not flow from the state. 136 The Court notably did not refer at
all to Dillon's Rule or any related authority for this point. Second, preemption
would invite "uncertain adventures" from municipality to municipality since
different states have different forms of municipal authorization law. 137 Under
such an approach, a city in one state could provide telecommunications service
while a neighboring city in a more restrictive state across the border could
not. 138 Congress, the Court concluded, could not have intended to create a
regulatory regime so susceptible to "strange and indeterminate results."' 139 The
Court, again, cited no legal authority to support this point. Finally, preemption
would levy "a one-way ratchet" as states would only be allowed to grant
municipalities the authority to develop telecommunications services but could
never take such power away.' 40 Such a restriction would leave states without
the ability to control municipalities in the way they traditionally might. 14 1 The
Court said so without citing anti-commandeering law or anything else for that
42
matter. 1
Here, in its discussion of municipal powerlessness, the Court saw states as
both disciplining agents against the uncertainty and indeterminacy consequent
of nationwide municipal participation as well as bulwarks against overly
intrusive federal meddling in local affairs. 143 Consistent with the robust
conception of plenary state authority popular among the majority of Justices for
the past generation, the Court has perceived the ideas of devolution and
decentralization at the core of federalism to be important means of protecting
against the arbitrary exercise of federal power, encouraging democratic

1341d. at 140 (majority opinion).

1351d. at 138.
136Id. at 135.
1371d. at 134.

138 Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 136.
139 id. at 133.
14 0 1d. at 137.

14 1Seeid.at 138.

142

143

See id

See id
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participation, and advancing efficiency, intergovernmental competition, and
44

pluralism. 1
But this is why Missouri Municipal League cannot be held out as supportive

of contemporary municipal broadband restrictions. First, preemption analysis is
a statute-and context-specific inquiry. The 2004 decision concerned
45
telecommunications under Title I of the amended Communications Act.'
Since 2005, federal policymakers have subjected broadband to regulation under
Title I, not Title 11. 146
Second, the notion of state plenary authority over local affairs has legal
pedigree and some normative heft, 147 but does not by itself supply a complete
account of how public law administration operates in the United States. For the
past several decades, Congress and federal agencies have employed a myriad of
regulatory arrangements that "engage local governments in national
policymaking and implementation" of communications law as much as
states. 14 8 The Court's analysis flies in the face of an array of federal regulatory
regimes that, consistent with Congress's authority under the Spending Clause,
overtly nudge states and state officials to advance national objectives. 14 9 The
federal-local structures for public law administration also preserve the
principles and "numerous advantages" that federalism ostensibly means to
vindicate: they assure that public law is "sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society," "increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes," "allows for more innovation and experimentation in
150 It
government," and "makes government more responsive" to residents.
should also be said that states often compete with each other in ways that

144 There are some indications, however, that the pendulum is swinging away from this
hard version of federalism to one that is more accommodating of restrictions on state power.
See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003).
145 Cf Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 128.
146
Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905
(2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC- 10-201A 1.pdf.
147See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 315 (7th ed. 2009) (explaining that "Dillon's Rule is the

counterpart" to the federalist presumption of plenary state legislative authority).
148 Davidson, supra note 13, at 1032; see also Hills, Jr., supra note 13, at 1208;
Reynolds, supra note 13, at 983-87.
149 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-69 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206 (1987); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267,427 (1998).
150

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also Edward L. Rubin &

Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903,

906-07 (1994).
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deliver fewer public goods to residents.' 5 1 As I show in Part II above and,
again, in Part V below, this is precisely what the new broadband localism
52
accomplishes.1
The Court's wariness about variability from locality to locality is, for this
reason, only half right. To be sure, courts have misgivings about regulatory
53
regimes that create an administratively unstable patchwork of local laws.' It
does not help, moreover, that Congress defines inconsistent and uneven roles
for localities in different federal statutory regimes. 154 But federal legislators
have been quite willing to let a thousand flowers bloom, promulgating
arrangements that treat local governments as junior partners in the
administration of federal public laws in a wide range of regulatory fields.' 55 A
cooperative role for localities works well in areas that require, for example,
immediate "site-specific" regulatory responses. 156 Congress may also want to
encourage innovation, experimentation, and "intergovernmental learning" that
can only really effectively occur at the local level. 157 Here, by making
assumptions about the uncertainty in a regime that allowed municipalities to
provide telecommunications service, 158 the Court substituted its own antiquated
and aesthetic view of how public law administration should work for the one
chosen by Congress. 15 9 The Court's conclusion about variability is inapposite
60
and inconsistent with the current state of affairs.1
At a minimum, the Missouri MunicipalLeague Court could have identified,
for example, the problems that legislators sought to address through the statute
15 1 See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 121-24 (1995); Richard B.
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation
ofNational
EnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977).
152 See supra Parts II.C, II.D; infra Part V.B.
153 See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424,
441-42 (2002).
154
See Decker, supra note 131, at 351-65; Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption
in FederalSiting Regimes, 48 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 307 (2011).
155 See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92
YALE L.J. 1344 (1983); Joshua D. Samoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of
Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 205 (1997). Justice John Paul
Stevens rejected this concern in his dissent, arguing that the "national crazy quilt" feared by
the majority would only be as concerning as the diversity of general municipal authorization
laws already in place across the country. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 146
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 See Ostrow, supra note 154, at 336.
157 Decker, supra note 131, at 362-64; see also Dorf& Sabel, supra note 149, at 321.
158 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 133-34 (2004) (discussing the
"strange and indeterminate results" and "uncertain adventures" consequent of preemption).
159 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 405, 435 (1989) (discussing courts as "faithful agents" of legislatures).
160This is to say nothing, moreover, of the Court's inattention to the way in which
federal and state law interacts with "home rule" jurisdictions.
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generally. 16 1 Or, alternatively, it could have relied on conference reports
attached to the final bill on which both chambers in Congress voted. 162 Such
inquiries have been a staple of preemption analysis and statutory interpretation
generally. 163 Courts, to be clearer, will allow federal laws to preempt state laws
to the extent the former veer into legislative fields already cordoned off as
important to congressional objectives. 164 Courts have found, for example, that
the amended Telecommunications Act impliedly preempts state or local laws
whose specific content or subject matter may not be explicitly addressed in a
by the "scope,
federal statute but that invade a subject area or "field" addressed
1 65
structure, and purpose" of federal law in the area generally.
In the end, however, the Court engaged in a thin analysis of
telecommunications law administration generally and the pertinent statutory
provision in particular. 166 By failing to meaningfully consider the full scope of
regulatory interventions in the regulatory field (under the amended
Communications Act and elsewhere) and the language and purpose of the
provisions at issue (Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act), the Court
failed to consider the full sweep of resources available for determining
167
legislative intent.
For these reasons, the Missouri Municipal League opinion presents very
little insight into the status of contemporary state restrictions on municipal
broadband. In Part IV below, I pick up where the Court left off and consider the
roles that Congress already has crafted for local governments in the amended
Communications Act.

161 See, e.g., infra Part V; cf Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1,
469 U.S. 256, 262 (1985).
162 Lawrence Cnty., 469 U.S. at 263-66; see also, e.g., infra Part V.
163 See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424,
440-41 (2002); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984). Implied
preemption doctrine in particular allows courts to invalidate state and local laws that
frustrate or conflict with federal law. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579
(2011); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
164
See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008).
165 See, e.g., N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 612 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir.
2010); see also Sw. Bell Wireless Inc. v. Johnson Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 199 F.3d
1185, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 1999).
166
See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 133-39 (2004).
167 Compare Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 976-80 (2005) (explaining the meaning of "offer"), with Muscarello v. United
States, 524 U.S. 125, 128-29 (1998) (explaining etymological origins of "carries"). See also
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) ("[T]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone in every preemption case."); Wisc. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597, 605 (1991); Crisp, 467 U.S. at 699; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947).
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IV. LOCAL PARTICIPATION

Local governments are sometimes best situated to discover and resolve
problems particular to their residents. 168 They have a unique familiarity with
local community characteristics and priorities, even if they often lack the
technological sophistication of private providers. Municipalities generally have
a superior institutional competence with which to implement law, prescribe
rules particular to their residents' needs, and facilitate collaborations between
anchor institutions and residents. 169 Of course, all of this unique and
independent capacity does not translate into legal authority to do so. Such
ability, however, is suggestive of a competence that is unavailable to federal or
state governments. 170 Indeed, these are7 the very attributes that justify local
"home rule" in states across the country.'1
Congress has appreciated the point. Federal laws and standards across
legislative fields often require municipal participation and implementation. 172 In
federal laws governing telecommunications and cable television services in
particular, Congress has acknowledged that its objectives are sometimes best
realized when local governments have a meaningful hand in implementation,
particularly when they affect local rights-of-way and land use. Below, I offer an
abbreviated history of Congress's reliance on local governments in the
development of law in these two legislative fields. I show that it generally
knows how to empower local governments, and how not to. Specifically, it has
eschewed local authority in the design of telecommunications regulation and
preserved limited local authority in cable regulation. Broadband regulation
today owes something to these approaches, particularly to the federal-local
cable service regulatory scheme. Moreover, these models offer important
guidance for prospective government administration and regulation of
broadband infrastructure.

A. Telecommunications
Almost since its inception at the end of the nineteenth century,
telecommunications service was dominated by one company. AT&T ruled
168 See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism,and the Problem ofInstitutional
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 57, 92-94 (1999).
169 See id; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal
Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REv. 377, 384-87, 384 n.35 (2005); Ostrow, supra
note 154, at 296.
170 See Davidson, supra note 13, at 991, 993. This is not always true, of course. See
Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60
U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 340 (1993) (discussing reluctance to federalize election law).
171 See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 996-1000.
172 See, e.g., Paul Teske, Wither the States? Comments on the DACA Federal-State
Framework,4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 365, 372 (2006).
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phone service much like a feudal lord would govern fiefdoms, providing long173
distance service and, through its several regional "Baby Bells," local service.
The 1996 Telecommunications Act established one of Congress's more
ambitious efforts to implement a regime for the regulation of
telecommunications that, to this day, has the FCC and state utility commissions
working more or less collaboratively on administering incumbent carriers'
obligations to unbundle their network elements, 174 interconnect with new
entrants in the market, 175 and price those elements fairly, 176 all without
requiring any input from local governments. 177 Before, the FCC and state utility
commissions operated in clearly delineated areas that had very little overlap.
Through the 1996 Amendments, Congress replaced this vestigial "dual
federalism" approach with one that struck a balance between a clearly defined
federal structure for regulation on the one hand and, on the other hand, state
discretion to implement, supplement, and experiment with that framework; this
has been called "cooperative federalism."'] 78 This regulatory design had federal
and state governments cooperating on issues for which, until 1996, they
179
generally were separately responsible under the 1934 Communications Act.
With the exception of high-profile antitrust litigation filed by the Department of
Justice against AT&T's monopoly practices in 1913, 1956, and 1982,180 federal
regulation of local telecommunications had been limited to the implementation
of common carrier principles, including, for example, pro-competitive rules
relating to tariff publication and interconnection.
While Congress clearly meant to focus on the relative roles of federal and
state governments, it did make allowances for a positive role for local
173 See BRETT

M.

FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE:

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES 211-17 (2012); MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION,
INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM
1-3 (1997); TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES

240-48 (2010).
174 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 25 1(c) (2006).
175 See, e.g., id. § 251 (b)(5)-(c)(2).
176 See, e.g., id.§ 252(d).

177See, e.g., AT&T Corp. V. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 384-85 (1999); U.S.
Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Philip J. Weiser, Federal
Common Law, CooperativeFederalism,and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1692, 1694 (2001).
178 See Weiser, supra note 177, at 1692, 1697. "Cooperative federalism" regimes are a
blend of "complete federal preemption" of state laws and "uncoordinated federal and state
action." Id. at 1697 (comparing "preemptive federalism" with "dual federalism").
179 Of course, in the event of conflict, federal law is always supreme. See Qwest Corp. v.
Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 567 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2009); Verizon New England, Inc. v.
Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 509 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007).
18
°See generally Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on
Origins and Regulatory Purpose,in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF 1934, at 3, 7-8 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
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governments. The statute does not impede local governments from, for
example, maintaining streets, highways, and pedestrian walkways. Localities
may do so as long as their interventions are applied in a "competitively neutral"
manner. 18 1 Elsewhere in the Act, Congress also granted to local governments
the primary authority to site network facilities like poles and pole
attachments. 182 This provision has been important to the development of
wireless broadband capabilities across the country, but, at the time, was meant
to strike the balance between facilitating "the growth of wireless telephone
183
service and to maintain substantial local control over siting of towers."'
But these were relatively minor tweaks in light of the big game that federal
legislators had in their sights in 1996. Congress was, above all, eager to lift
nearly all unnecessary regulatory burdens on competition and entry into the
local telecommunications market. It accordingly partnered with states to
84
accomplish this ambitious objective. 1
The Act, however, also makes plain that states are not necessarily standing
on an equal footing with Congress or federal agencies. Through Section 253(a)
in particular, legislators were keen on lifting all unnecessary state and local
barriers to competition and market entry. Sponsors of the bill, for example,
prevailed over a tiny minority of legislators who did not want to see state
regulatory authority diminished. 185 Overwhelming majorities in both chambers
evidently had little confidence in states' ability or will to encourage competition
in the local telecommunications market. 186 The bill to which members agreed,
again, endowed the FCC with the power to preempt state and local laws that
posed any unnecessary barriers to market entry, only making allowances for

18147 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2006); see also TCG N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d
67, 76-79 (2d Cir. 2002); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 620 N.E.2d
1993) (holding that municipalities' interests over streets are regulatory, not
1040, 1042 (Ill.
proprietary).
18247 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2006).
183
Omnipoint Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 430 F.3d 529, 531 (2d Cir.
2005). See generally Robert B. Foster, What the Meaning of "May" May Be: Recent
Developments in JudicialReview of Land Use Regulation of Cellular Telecommunications
Facilities Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 41 URB. LAW. 501, 503-12 (2009).
184See Charles H. Sanders, A Step Toward Competition in Local Telephone Service:
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 12 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 647, 654-55 (1999).
185
See 141 CONG. REc. S8306-07 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dirk

Kempthorne). See generally Duane McLaughlin, Note, FCC Jurisdiction over Local
Telephone Under the 1996 Act: Fenced Off?, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2210, 2233-34 (1997).
186 See 141 CONG. REC. S8173 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Larry

Pressler); H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 5-6, 9-10 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also Library of
Congress, THOMAS, Search Bill Summary & Status for the 104th Congress, S.652,

http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/104search.html (search "S.652") (last visited Sept. 27, 2012)
(displaying vote tally).
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state laws that regulate rights-of-way, impose competitively neutral
187
requirements on providers, protect consumers, and assure universal service.
Legislators also seemed to consider local government agencies to be among
188
market entrants that would be protected from unnecessary barriers.
new
the
The conference report to which managers from both chambers agreed explained
that Section 253 would forbid "explicit prohibitions on entry by a utility into
telecommunications."1 89 Such "utilities" were to include municipal
telecommunications among other providers of electric, gas, water, or steam
services who sought to enter the telecommunications market. 190 From this
vantage point, it is, as Justice Stevens averred in his dissent in Missouri
Municipal League, "implausible" that Congress did not appreciate that
19 1
municipal telecommunications would be among such entities.
The legislative record is nevertheless not crystal clear on whether municipal
telecommunications projects were among the new entrants that Congress meant
to encourage. For example, the preface to the House report in particular implies
that the direct beneficiaries of Section 253(a) would be private operators and
not governments. 192 The FCC's own history of interpreting the pertinent
93
provisions of the Act further complicates the picture.1
B. Cable Television
The political economy and historical trajectory of cable television
regulation is meaningfully different from that of telecommunications. As I
discuss below, federal and state regulators were quite reluctant to intervene in
the new market for what was then quaintly called community antenna
television. They ceded the regulatory ground in this early period to local
community cooperatives and governments. While they generally employed a
18747 U.S.C. § 253(a)-(c).

18 8 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 143-44 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
189 S. REP. No. 104-230, at 127 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
1901d. at 98.
191 Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 143 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19 2 See S. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). The bill, the report asserts, would
establish a "national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector
deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to
all Americans." Id. (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 75 (1996).
193
Five years earlier, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed an FCC determination that
Section 253(a) did not preempt a Texas state restriction on municipal telecommunications
service. City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (comparing to Salinas v.
United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997), in which the Court explicitly refused to impose a
narrowing construction on the modifier "any"). The Missouri Municipal League Court
recognized this history. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 132. It took the case because of the
circuit split occasioned by the Eighth Circuit's construction of the term "any entity." Id. at
131.
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relatively light touch in the early years, local governments were, as such, the
first and most active cable policymakers. Even after the FCC and then Congress
began enacting regulations and laws governing the retransmission of broadcast
signals, I show here that Congress enshrined the vestigial localist approach in
the 1984 and 1992 amendments to the Communications Act, substantially
accommodating a regulatory and operational role for local authorities. Over
time, I explain, local authorities have become quite aggressive at extracting all
manner of public-regarding conditions from cable operators, inviting some
important pushback from federal regulators. States, however, have remained
mostly outsiders, even while they have retained the control over the
establishment and operation of cable franchising authorities.
Today, most consumers obtain their broadband service from a cable
operator rather than a telecommunications service provider. But it was not
always like this. Cable operators, too, were once the new market entrant. The
first providers of cable service unwittingly developed a video distribution model
on which operators basically continue to depend today.
In the late 1940s and 1950s, most Americans could count on receiving a
broadcast signal, even if no station existed locally. This, however, was not true
for all. Some communities could not enjoy the programs that were lighting up
living rooms across the country. This was because, among other things, the cost
of building and operating television stations in all but large metropolitan areas
was commercially prohibitive. 194 Some communities-namely, in the valleys of
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Arkansas-lived without television. 195 Located just
outside of the reach of any television signal, these communities could only
receive frustratingly unintelligible snippets. Mountains and high hills shielded
other communities from receiving signals. Neighboring communities that sat
atop of the Allegheny Mountains, for example, received signals, while those
196
tucked in the lower valleys nearby did not.
It was in these small- to medium-sized valley communities from which
Community Antenna Television (CATV) sprung. Forward-looking residents in
those towns generally relied on existing signal amplification and distribution
technologies to develop cable television as we know it. 197 They used large
antennae atop relatively tall structures or hilltops to receive signals from the
nearest television stations. They then relayed those signals by cable and, to a
lesser extent, "line-of-sight" microwave signaling directly to the first cable
19 4 MARY ALICE & MAYER PHILLIPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA

TELEVISION 42 (1972). The FCC also halted its licensing process from 1948 to 1952 as it
faced a sudden increase in station applications. See PATRICK PARSONS, BLUE SKIES: A
HISTORY OF CABLE TELEVISION 47-49 (2008).
19 5 See MEGAN MULLEN, TELEVISION IN THE MULTICHANNEL AGE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF

CABLE TELEVISION 33-41 (2008); PARSONS, supra note 194, at 50.
196 PARSONS, supra note 194, at 57.
19 7

See id. at 55.
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subscribers, who, in turn, paid around $135 for installation and a monthly
charge of around $3.75.198
State and federal officials did not know how or want to classify or regulate
CATV service in these early years. Early on, the FCC determined that cable
television service was related to interstate transmission and had adverse
consequences for local broadcasting generally. 19 9 It believed, nevertheless, that
200
this fact was insufficient to justify imposing common carrier requirements.
As with other observers, the Commissioners believed that CATV was a
temporary technological fix. 20 1 They assumed that they had no choice but to
accommodate local interests.
Local governments, however, were not as forbearing as federal or state
governments. From the late 1940s into the early 1960s, small valley towns and
local authorities across the country cooperated with cable operators without
explicit support or hindrance from state or federal governments. 20 2 Many at this
early stage entered into extremely lenient rights-of-way arrangements, allowing,
203
for example, CATV systems to operate without any formalized authorization.
Most others adopted resolutions or entered into franchise agreements. But even
these were rather lenient, often authorizing operators to construct systems in
public rights-of-way within the municipal limits for little to no consideration. 204
A minority of municipalities were not afraid to restrict cable operators' access
to public rights-of-way and land.20 5 In the end, local regulation varied from
community to community; some municipalities imposed toothless requirements,
20
while others treated cable service as a public utility. 6
Municipalities began expecting more from cable operators in the 1960s,
imposing franchise fees and renewable limited terms. 207 By the end of the
1960s, local authorities across the country imposed, among other things,
franchise fees of five percent of gross revenues and required operators to
198 See, e.g., ALICE & PHILLIPS, supra note 194, at 42.

199See Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV
"Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of Television
Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-30 (1959) [hereinafter Impact of Community Antenna
Systems];
see also United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164 (1968).
20 0
See Impact of Community Antenna Systems, 26 F.C.C. at 431.
201 PARSONS, supra note 194, at 72.
202 ALICE & PHILLIPS, supra note 194, at 7-9, 12-14, 41-45.
20 3
See id. at 153; DON R. LE Duc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA
CONTROL
127 (1973).
204

See MARTIN H. SEIDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA
TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY, REPORT TO THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 44 (1965).

205 PARSONS, supra note 194, at 91.
2 06
SEIDEN, supra note 204, at 44; PARSONS, supra note 194, at 108.
2 07
DANIEL L. BRENNER, MONROE E. PRICE & MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, CABLE
TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 10.2 (Apr. 2011); LE Duc, supra note

203, at 127-28.
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provide free educational, governmental, and informational services, as well as
obligations to indemnify the city against liability arising from the use of public
rights-of-way. 20 8 They also secured assurances of signal quality, as well as
control over the transfer of property to and from operators and cable rate
changes. 20 9 It was only then that the FCC became more aggressive in its
regulatory posture, justifying the regulation of cable operators' importation of
distant signals on the grounds that it had jurisdiction over the regulation of local
2 10
broadcasters.
Local authorities across the country, moreover, have owned and operated
cable service systems for almost as long as cable television has existed.2 11 They
have done this to provide service to residents, but also to introduce competition
in local consumer markets otherwise dominated by one or two major cable or
satellite providers. 2 12 A vertically integrated multichannel video programming
distributor with a significant stake in content, they feared, could leverage its
dominant position in a particular local area to keep out the competition. 2 13 The
amended Communications Act, in fact, encourages municipal ownership in
precisely such circumstances; local authorities may own and operate cable
networks without a franchise as long as they do not also provide video
programming. 2 14 A local authority may do so even when it issues nonexclusive
franchises to private multichannel video programming distributors with which it
vies for the same subscribers. 2 15 The courts enforce such local-franchiseagreement terms as though they were contracts between fully autonomous
2 16
parties.
States began limiting or altogether banning municipal cable service and
even local government cable regulation in the late 1970s, well after local
authorities already had been active.2 17 Through state constitutional amendment
or legislative enactment, they did this with little or no resistance on the premise
2 18
that local governments derive all of their legal authority from the state.
208

LE

Duc, supra note 203, at 127-28; see also City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341,

348 2(5th
Cir. 1999).
09

SELDEN, supra note

204, at 46-47.

2 10

See generally United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164-68 (1968).
211 See Carl R. Ramey, The Cable Act and Municipal Ownership: A Growing First
Amendment
Confrontation, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 147, 156 (1993).
2 12
See id.
2 13

See generally Susan Crawford, The Looming Cable Monopoly, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y

REV. INTER ALIA 34 (2010). See also 47 U.S.C. § 548(b) (2006).
21447 U.S.C. § 541(f)(2) (2006).
215 Id. § 541(D(1)-(2).

216 See, e.g., Helix Elec., Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 571, 572-73 (2005) (holding
that franchise agreements for military bases are contracts subject to the Federal Acquisition
Regulations).
2 17
See BRENNER ET AL., supra note 207, § 3.4; JAMES C. GOODALE & ROB FRIEDEN, ALL
ABOUT CABLE AND BROADBAND § 4.02[1] (Law Journal Press 2011).
2 18
See supra note 217.
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Today, all states regulate local authority over cable franchising and cable
television generally through the explicit grant of home-rule powers, general
police powers, specific authority over streets and rights-of-way, or specific
authority over local franchising. 2 19 Most states have claimed, among other
things, the authority to promulgate rules, impose reporting requirements, collect
fees, assist in the development of services, and develop statewide
telecommunications plans.220
Congress further narrowed the regulatory role for local government
intervention in cable service in the 1984 and 1992 amendments to the
Communications Act. A new Title VI addressing cable television imposed
limits on the obligations that local authorities could impose on cable operators,
barring authorities from imposing unreasonable fees or unreasonably refusing to
award additional competitive franchises. 22 1 The courts have elaborated the
point, explaining that, pursuant to the 1992 Act, municipalities only have a
regulatory interest in the streets and rights-of-way through which operators
develop cable networks, not a proprietary one.2 22 The 1996
Telecommunications Act and subsequent FCC rules have done little to alter this
223
central but limited role for local authorities.
All in all, then, the history of cable television suggests a limited but
essential role for local ownership, administration, and regulation. It does not
completely rebuke the plenary state authority view on which the Missouri
2 19

See BRENNER ET AL., supra note 207, § 3.4; see also KAOK-CATV, Inc. v. La. Cable
T.V., Inc., 195 So.2d 297, 300 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (organic state statute only authorizes
local authority in Louisiana to grant franchises for the transmission of heat, light and power,
not for cable or other video services); Nugeni v. City of East Providence, 238 A.2d 758,
760-61 (R.I. 1968) (home rule charter does not authorize municipality to grant an exclusive
cable franchise because state legislature reserves all authority to regulate businesses in the
state not enumerated in charter). Largely in response to the entry of telecommunications
companies in the multichannel video programming distribution market in the past six to
seven years, moreover, eleven states now claim exclusive cable franchising authority in
several states, effectively preempting any local role whatsoever. See BRENNER ET AL., supra
note220
207, § 3.11.
See BRENNER ET AL., supra note 207, § 3.14.
221 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 542(b)(2)(B) (2006); see also Alliance for Cmty. Media
v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 767-68 (6th Cir. 2008); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d
957,222
971-73 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See City of New York v. Bee Line, 284 N.Y.S. 452, 456 (1935); see also S. REP. No.
102-92, at 47 (1991) (1992 Cable Act). Even before 1992, the Supreme Court had held that
a municipality is not exempt from antitrust liability when it regulates cable service unless the
authority to regulate was clearly and explicitly given by the state, in which case the state
action doctrine applies and exempts the municipality from antitrust liability. See Cmty.
Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1982); see also City of Lafayette v.
La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1978).
22 3
The FCC, for example, has curtailed anticompetitive and extortionate behavior by
local officials. See, e.g., Strategic Plan of the FCC, FCC (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/strategic-plan-fcc.
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Municipal League opinion is based, but it suggests a far more complicated
account of local ability or authority than the Court admitted.
It is this ambiguity that advocates of state plenary authority fail to
acknowledge. As I explain in Part V below, the example of municipal
broadband drives the point home as well as any other. To be sure, broadband, as
a technology and in regulation, owes something to the historical development of
telecommunications and cable service discussed here. But it is a different
animal. Below, I describe the emergent regulatory regime, identify some of the
advantages and limitations of the new approach and, on the basis of these,
recommend a way forward.
V. THE EMERGENT DESIGN
The FCC has treated computer-enhanced communications services as a
distinct category of communications service since the 1970s. 22 4 It did so even as
the Internet "backbone" was composed of telecommunications (i.e., not
broadband) infrastructure. Congress ratified this regulatory approach in the
1996 amendments to the Communications Act,2 25 identifying "information
services" as distinct from the pure transmission services addressed under other
provisions of the Act. By 2005, the FCC and the Court clarified the regulatory
status of these emergent "information services," explaining that they are distinct
from conventional telecommunications or cable service. 226 Today, many
municipalities, including some in Missouri, provide broadband service on the
premise that state restrictions on municipal communications services do not
22 7
cover "Interet-type" services.
This distinction is even more vivid in the emergent regulatory design.
Policymakers have given local authorities wide discretion in ways that, for
technological and commercial reasons, they never imagined for
telecommunications or cable television. For the past decade, municipalities
across the country have been strategizing about ways to bring high-speed, highquality Internet access to their communities when private providers fail to.
Here, the barriers to private investment are as demographic as they are
topographic; the prohibitively high expense of building infrastructure for
relatively distant and sparsely populated communities makes it difficult to
provide service to everyone. It only makes sense, therefore, that local anchor
institutions and municipalities are developing and providing service to
224
225

See Sylvain, supranote 31, at 235-38 (discussing the FCC's Computer cases).

See Duane McLaughlin, FCC Jurisdiction over Local Telephone Under the 1996

Act: Fenced Off?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2210, 2211 (1997) (quoting Sen. John Kerry).
226See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, para. 1 (2005) (report and order and notice of proposed
rulemaking); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967,227
967-69 (2005).
See Mo. REV. STAT. § 392.410(7) (2011).
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residents. Internet access and participation rates depend largely on these
stakeholders' willingness to invest and experiment with broadband technology.
As such, I argue here, policymakers should do everything possible to
aggressively involve local communities in the administration of broadband law
and policy.
A. BroadbandIs Different
The history of the technology and political economy from which the new
broadband localism is emerging is distinctive. The Internet did not sprout out of
community efforts in the same way that cable did. It was a top-down venture in
the beginning: the offspring of a midcentury Defense Department project to
develop a redundant and geographically dispersed "internetwork" of computers
whose chief purpose was to keep valuable information safe from Soviet
attack. 228 The emergent broadband localism represents a marked shift from this
early design concept.
The respective interests of the stakeholders in the broadband industry also
are significantly different. Broadcasters owned the copyrights to the
programming that the first cable operators retransmitted without consent. The
former accordingly fought and won statutory protections against the "siphoningoff" of the audiences on which their advertising model is based. 22 9 Today, some
broadband service providers and a handful of the largest Internet content
developers have shown a keen interest in bundling content and application
offerings with broadband service. 230 Most of the latter, however, have not done
so. Indeed, the vast majority of major content and application developers like
Facebook, Zynga, and Amazon welcome build-out projects that connect them
with as many users as possible without fear of having their audiences
"siphoned-off."
228

See Robert E. Kahn & Vinton G. Cerf, What Is the Internet (and What Makes It
Work)?, in OPEN ARCHITECTURE AS COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRESERVING INTERNET
FREEDOM IN THE BROADBAND ERA 17, 18-19 (Mark N. Cooper ed., 2004); JONATHAN L.
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND How To STOP IT 28 (2008); In-Sung Yoo,
Note, The Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the Federal
Communications Commission Should Abstain from Cable Service Regulation and Promote
BroadbandDeployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199, 202-03 (2009).
229
See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A) (2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
230
See, e.g., David Kravets, ISPs to Disrupt Internet Access of Copyright Scofflaws,

(July 7, 2011, 11:08 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/disruptinginternet-access/ (discussing agreement between major content producers and broadband
service providers on "mitigation measures" for reducing copyright infringement online);
Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal, GOOGLE, https://docs.google.com/
viewer?url=http://www.google.com/googleblogs/pdfs/verizongoogle legislative framewor
kproposal_081010.pdf&pli=l (last visited Aug. 17, 2012) (arguing, inter alia, that
broadband providers should be able to offer "differentiated online services, in addition to the
Internet access").
WIRED
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Municipal broadband projects merely provide users with the transmission
capacity to access the diverse array of Internet content and applications. They
do not bother at all with tying application and content to infrastructure, for
example. In any event, municipal service providers do not have the same
proprietary or pecuniary ambitions as private providers. To be sure, there
remain important competition problems to resolve when a local regulatory
authority competes with private providers in the provision of service, but those
are of a different sort. 2 31 Municipal broadband, as currently conceived, aims
above all to provide communities the opportunity to develop and gain access to
Internet-based applications and content.
B. FederalFunding,Local Initiative
To put it slightly differently, municipal intervention in broadband
administration is far more important than it ever was in the telecommunications
or cable settings because, today, users have the potential to interact with and
learn from others in ways that were never conceivable with those older
communication technologies. Congress, to its credit, has responded. For the past
several years, it has enacted laws and federal programs with the clear and
manifest intention of making broadband service available to everyone. It has
relied on a diversity of legislative tools that focus on broadband deployment as
a local phenomenon. Early on, for example, Congress delegated to the FCC the
task of mapping and reporting on broadband service availability and
transmission speeds in each local area. 232 This effort predictably required
extensive local participation.
But Congress more recently has gone much further, delegating grantmaking responsibilities to a variety of federal agencies to accomplish the
national policy objectives of broadband deployment and service accessibility. 23 3
Legislators presume that such investments will help to produce jobs and bring
the country out of its economic doldrums. 234 Under the proposed Broadband
Conduit Deployment Act, moreover, grants for upgrading or repairing roads
would be tied to building out conduits for broadband wiring along those
roads. 2 35 This "dig once" legislation aims to avoid the substantial transaction
231 See supra Part I.C.
232

See 47 U.S.C. § 1301 (Supp. V 2011); Development of Nationwide Broadband Data
to Evaluate Reasonable and Timely Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans, 23
FCC Rcd. 9691, 9692 (2008) (report and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking).
233 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (Supp. V 2011) (requiring the FCC to "take
immediate
action to accelerate deployment").
234
See Deborah D. McAdams, Tech Advisors Tell FCC to Launch Local Broadband
Deployment

Competition, TVTECHNOLOGY

(Apr. 25,

2011),

http://www.television

broadcast.com/article/1
19710.
235
See Broadband Conduit Deployment Act of 2011, H.R. 1965, 112th Cong. § 330(a)
(2011).
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costs of repeated road excavations. 2 36 Another bill under consideration in the
current session of Congress would require all newly constructed federal public
buildings to be equipped for wireless service after 2014.237 Along these same
lines, this past summer, the President signed an Executive Order that, among
other things, makes broadband construction along Federal roadways and
2 38
properties up to ninety percent cheaper.
Very recently, moreover, the FCC launched a series of initiatives aimed at
accelerating local broadband deployment and service. These include facilitating
public-private partnerships in support of underserved communities, offering
such things as Internet skills classes, tutoring, and online job certification
programs online. 239 The agency also has successfully encouraged major
broadband providers to supply one-megabit-per-second service for two years for
just ten-dollars-a-month voluntarily to families with school-age children
enrolled in the free lunch program. 240 Currently, the FCC has initiated rulemaking proceedings for the reform of subsidy programs for public libraries,
schools, and high-cost service areas, as well as the rules governing utility poles,
24 1
rights-of-way, collocation, and the siting of wireless antennas and towers.
The Commission also has made portions of the electromagnetic spectrum
available for unlicensed and flexible wireless broadband, and is exploring
242
adding more.
Congress articulated the largest of these public broadband infrastructure
programs, however, as I explain in Part II, in the 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. Interestingly, several of these projects are also located in
states with complete bans or prohibitive restrictions on municipal broadband.
These include publicly supported infrastructure projects in Charlotte, North

236

See Paul Barbagallo, Calif Rep. Eshoo Introduces 'Dig Once' Broadband
4,
2011),
Conduits,
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(May
Legislation
Requiring
http://www.bna.com/calif-rep-eshoo-n6809/.
237 Federal Winet Act, S. 3439, 112th Cong. (2012).
238
See Exec. Order No. 13,616, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,903 (June 14, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/14/executive-order-acceleratingbroadband-infrastructure-deployment. See generally About US Ignite, US IGNITE, http://usignite.org/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
239See Our Mission, CONNECT2COMPETE, http://www.connect2compete.org/about-us

(last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
240See Michael Powell, Cable Encourages More Families to "Connect to Compete,"
CABLE TECH TALK, http://www.cabletechtalk.com/tag/broadband-adoption/

(last visited

October 28,2012).
241 See FCC, SEVENTH BROADBAND PROGRESS REPORT ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION,
para. 6 (2011).
242See Innovation in the Broadcast Television Bands, 25 FCC Rcd. 16,498, 16,498
(2010) (notice of proposed rulemaking); Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands,
25 FCC Rcd. 18,661, 18,662 (2010) (second memorandum opinion and order).
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Carolina, the Rio Grande Valley in Texas, and Cass County, Missouri. 24 3 Some
of these have seized on vague language in the pertinent state statutes that make
exceptions for "Internet-type" services. As the local governments in these areas
see it, legislators never meant to include broadband among the communication
technologies that local political subdivisions are forbidden from providing. 244 In
any event, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, Congress could command the
NTIA or RUS to award grants to municipal governments without interference
from state governments. Clearly, Congress and the agencies to which it has
delegated these grant-making programs have preempted state restrictions on
245
municipal broadband.
With the Recovery Act, Congress acknowledged the vital role of local
participation in broadband service and policymaking. The Act, however, lacks a
fully articulated vision of how to make municipal broadband a sustainable
venture. Nor does it establish a sustained role for local governments.
Appropriations like those in the Recovery Act are by their very nature one-shot
stimulants. 246 They cannot be relied on for long-term structural support, as they
247
are subject to shifting political winds.
The experiences in municipal broadband from the past decade or so
nevertheless have lessons to teach.248 In this short period, some regulatory
approaches have worked and others have not.2 49 We know, for example, that, at
least anecdotally, franchise agreements do not work well.2 50 Then again, much
also remains unknown.2 5 1 Policymakers, for instance, do not yet know the
extent to which municipal broadband will generate the economic benefits that
so many expect. 252 These early experiences nevertheless provide helpful
preliminary data from which federal and local policymakers can learn and,
presumably, replicate where appropriate.
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244 See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 392.410(7) (2011).
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1. MunicipalAutonomy
The one important and distinctive feature of the new broadband localism is
the scope of municipal independence. Entrepreneurial autonomy is more or less
assumed in the Recovery Act's grant-making process but does not originate
with it. Indeed, Congress seems to have acceded to the idea because localities
had been asserting themselves well before Congress decided to intervene.
An important ancillary point here, that I have repeated throughout this
Article, is that we should not confuse municipal broadband with municipal
regulation of broadband. One of the lessons of the development of
telecommunications and cable television regulation is that courts, Congress, and
state legislatures have not looked favorably on anticompetitive or regulatory
interventions by local authorities that unfairly or unreasonably choose service
winners or losers. For example, Congress has only permitted "competitively
neutral" regulation of telecommunications and, in certain circumstances,
permitted local governments to be subject to antitrust liability when they do
regulate local service providers. 253 Federal and state lawmakers have done the
same in connection with cable franchise agreements, forbidding unfair and anticompetitive terms in particular. These same sorts of restrictions on municipal
regulation of broadband would make sense. But, again, they would be distinct
from the provision of municipal broadband.
2. Supportfor Underservedand Unserved
One of the chief and guiding reasons for municipal broadband is the failure
of private providers to deliver adequate service to poorer and lower density
areas. Today, most providers do not have an incentive to finance last-mile
infrastructure if there is no prospect of recouping their investment immediately.
And, indeed, their chances of seeing long-term returns on investment in certain
2 54
sparsely populated or low-income areas are low.
Meanwhile, about 26 million U.S. residents do not have access to any
broadband service even if they wanted it.2 55 Americans with low incomes
constitute the greater share of those without broadband access. 2 56 This access
deficit is particularly pronounced in predominately white or Tribal rural
areas. 257 Those who are less educated, unemployed, disabled, senior, black, or
Latino are also less likely to subscribe to broadband service than those who are
2 53
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affluent, well-educated, and white. 2 58 This is true, even if it is available. All in
all, a little under one-third of Americans do not subscribe to any form of high259
speed Internet service at home even though it is available in their local area.
Local municipalities have a clear interest in filling this gap among their
residents if, as it is suspected, connectivity will bring greater benefits to the
local community at large.
3. Local Accountability
The success of any given municipal broadband project depends, of course,
on the objectives set out by local authorities. If, for example, municipalities
intend to use the project to develop or improve access for unserved
communities, the project would be successful to the extent the access gap was
smaller after its implementation. Or if municipalities intend to use the project to
encourage investment in local businesses, success might be measured by the
metrics set out by local business associations and chambers of commerce. In
any event, for municipal broadband to work, local authorities must play a
positive and integral role in aligning objectives with outcomes. If they fail,
residents have a remedy in the ballot box or through some other democratically
260
legitimated process.
4. Competition
Residents sometimes do not subscribe to service because it is much more
expensive than they can afford. Some of the reason for this is the lack of
competition. 26 1 The vast majority of residents obtain Internet access from one of
just two providers in their local area: an effective duopoly in communities
across the country controlled by the local incumbent cable provider and the
incumbent telephone operator. 262 Only four percent of U.S. residents live in
areas serviced by three or more fixed broadband providers, where the third
2 58
2 59

See id at paras. 4, 44.
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ii (2011),

available at

http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/exploring the digital-nation-computer-and
_internet use at home 11092011.pdf.
2 60
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PUBLIC ADMIN. REv., Dec. 2006, at 66; Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening
Democracy: Innovations in Empowered ParticipatoryGovernance, 29 POLS. & SOC'Y 5
(2001); see also Hills, Jr., supra note 13 at 2027 (2000).
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Up?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 110th Cong. (2007)
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provider tends to be a second cable company. 263 Approximately thirteen percent
of residents live in areas with just one broadband provider, and these are likelier
to be low-income than high-income. 264 And, while both cable and
telecommunication companies are investing heavily in next-generation
networks and technologies, cable operators' high-speed modem service appears
to be winning over more subscribers than telecommunications companies'
digital subscriber line service and threatening a "looming cable monopoly" in
2 65
broadband.
Recent research shows that network owners invest in infrastructure when
they feel the looming threat of competition. 266 Apart from remedies in antitrust
law, neither Congress nor officials at the FCC and Federal Trade Commission
have promulgated competition rules for broadband markets in the way they
have for, say, telecommunications and cable service providers. Federal and
local officials and agencies instead have adopted an ad hoc approach, imposing
pro-competitive conditions on mergers involving broadband. While it is not a
panacea, municipal broadband is one solution for the dearth of competition.
VI. CONCLUSION

Much work remains to be done if policymakers are to understand how full
broadband integration into public life is to be effectuated. I have argued here
that the new broadband localism-that is, the perspective and approach that
privileges local public investment and participation in the administration of
broadband service---offers an opening. First, however, lawmakers and courts
must unshackle local governments from the antiquated structural obstacles and
burdens in law imposed on them by state governments in particular. In order to
do that, either Congress must act to preempt such efforts, or courts must be
prepared to accept that municipalities are as fundamental to the administration
of public law as are states.
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